Details bij Organisatie, sterke interactie: Parkinsons Law
| 15 sep.2009 |
... When
first examined under the microscope, the cabinet council
usually appears–to comitologists, historians, and even to
the people who appoint cabinets–to consist ideally of five.
With that number the plant is viable, allowing for two
members to be absent or sick at any one time. Five members
are easy to collect and, when collected, can act with
competence, secrecy, and speed. Of these original members
four may well be versed, respectively, in finance, foreign
policy, defense, and law. The fifth, who has failed to
master any of these subjects, usually becomes the chairman
or prime minister.
Whatever
the apparent convenience might be of restricting the
membership to five, however, we discover by observation that
the total number soon rises to seven or nine. The usual
excuse given for this increase, which is almost invariable (exceptions
being found, however, in Luxembourg and Honduras), is the
need for special knowledge on more than four topics. In fact,
however, there is another and more potent reason for adding
to the team. For in a cabinet of nine it will be found that
policy is made by three, information supplied by two, and
financial warning uttered by one. With the neutral chairman,
that accounts for seven, the other two appearing at first
glance to be merely ornamental. This allocation of duties
was first noted in Britain in about 1639, but there can be
no doubt that the folly of including more than three able
and talkative men in one committee had been discovered long
before then. We know little as yet about the function of the
two silent members but we have good reason to believe that a
cabinet, in this second stage of development, might be
unworkable without them.
There are
cabinets in the world (those of Costa Rica, Ecuador,
Northern Ireland, Liberia, the Philippines, Uruguay, and
Panama will at once be called to mind) which have remained
in this second stage–that is, have restricted their
membership to nine. These remain, however, a small minority.
Elsewhere and in larger territories cabinets have generally
been subject to a law of growth. Other members come to be
admitted, some with a claim to special knowledge but more
because of their nuisance value when excluded. Their
opposition can be silenced only by implicating them in every
decision that is made. As they are brought in (and placated)
one after another, the total membership rises from ten
toward twenty. In this third stage of cabinets, there are
already considerable drawbacks.
The most
immediately obvious of these disadvantages is the difficulty
of assembling people at the same place, date, and time. One
member is going away on the 18th, whereas another does not
return until the 21st. A third is never free on Tuesdays,
and a fourth never available before 5 P.M. But that is only
the beginning of the trouble, for, once most of them are
collected, there is a far greater chance of members proving
to be elderly, tiresome, inaudible, and deaf. Relatively few
were chosen from any idea that they are or could be or have
ever been useful. A majority perhaps were brought in merely
to conciliate some outside group. Their tendency is
therefore to report what happens to the group they
represent. All secrecy is lost and, worst of all, members
begin to prepare their speeches. They address the meeting
and tell their friends afterwards about what they imagine
they have said. But the more these merely representative
members assert themselves, the more loudly do other outside
groups clamor for representation. Internal parties form and
seek to gain strength by further recruitment. The total of
twenty is reached and passed. And thereby, quite suddenly,
the cabinet enters the fourth and final stage of its
history.
For at this point of cabinet development (between 20 and 22 members) the whole
committee suffers an abrupt organic or chemical change. The nature of this
change is easy to trace and comprehend. In the first place, the five members who
matter will have taken to meeting beforehand. With decisions already reached,
little remains for the nominal executive to do. And, as a consequence of this,
all resistance to the committee’s expansion comes to an end. More members will
not waste more time; for the whole meeting is, in any case, a waste of time. So
the pressure of outside groups is temporarily satisfied by the admission of
their representatives, and decades may elapse before they realize how illusory
their gain has been. With the doors wide open, membership rises from 20 to 30,
from 30 to 40. There may soon be an instance of such a membership reaching the
thousand mark. But this does not matter. For the cabinet has already ceased to
be a real cabinet, and has been succeeded in its old functions by some other
body.
Five times in English history the plant has moved through its life cycle. It
would admittedly be difficult to prove that the first incarnation of the cabinet–the
English Council of the Crown, now called the House of Lords–ever had a
membership as small as five. When we first hear of it, indeed, its more intimate
character had already been lost, with a hereditary membership varying from 29 to
50. Its subsequent expansion, however, kept pace with its loss of power. In
round figures, it had 60 members in 1601, 140 in 1661, 220 in 1760, 400 in 1850,
650 in 1911, and 850 in 1952.
At what point in this progression did the inner committee appear in the womb of
the peerage? It appeared in about 1257, its members being called the Lords of
the King’s Council and numbering less than 10. They numbered no more than 11 in
1378, and as few still in 1410. Then, from the reign of Henry V, they began to
multiply. The 20 of 1433 had become the 41 of 1504, the total reaching 172
before the council finally ceased to meet.
Within the King’s Council there developed the cabinet’s third incarnation–the
Privy Council–with an original membership of nine. It rose to 20 in 1540, to 29
in 1547, and to 44 in 1558. The Privy Council as it ceased to be effective
increased proportionately in size. It had 47 members in 1679, 67 in 1723, 200 in
1902, and 300 in 1951.
Within
the Privy Council there developed the junto or Cabinet
Council, which effectively superseded the former in about
1615. Numbering 8 when we first hear of it, its members had
come to number 12 by about 1700, and 20 by 1725. The Cabinet
Council was then superseded in about 1740 by an inner group,
since called simply the Cabinet. Its development is best
studied in tabular form. This is shown in Table I.
TABLE
I–GROWTH OF THE ENGLISH CABINET
|
1740 |
5
|
1885 |
16 |
1945 |
16 |
|
1784 |
7
|
1900 |
20 |
1945 |
20 |
|
1801 |
12 |
1915 |
22 |
1949 |
17 |
|
1841 |
14 |
1935 |
22 |
1954 |
18 |
| |
|
1939 |
23 |
|
|
From
1939, it will be apparent, there has been a struggle to save
this institution; a struggle similar to the attempts made to
save the Privy Council during the reign of Queen Elizabeth
I. The Cabinet appeared to be in its decline in 1940, with
an inner cabinet (of 5, 7, or 9 members) ready to take its
place. The issue, however, remains in doubt. It is just
possible that the British cabinet is still an important
body.
Compared
with the cabinet of Britain, the cabinet of the United
States has shown an extraordinary resistance to political
inflation. It had the appropriate number of 5 members in
1789, still only 7 by 1840, 9 by 1901, 10 by 1913, 11 by
1945, and then–against tradition–had come down to 10 again
by 1953. Whether this attempt, begun in 1947, to restrict
the membership will succeed for long is doubtful. All
experience would suggest the inevitability of the previous
trend. In the meanwhile, the United States enjoys (with
Guatemala and El Salvador) a reputation for
cabinet-exclusiveness, having actually fewer cabinet
ministers than Nicaragua or Paraguay.
TABLE II
- SIZE OF CABINETS
|
No. of Members |
|
|
6
|
Honduras, Luxembourg |
|
7
|
Haiti, Iceland, Switzerland |
|
9
|
Costa Rica, Ecuador, N. Ireland, Liberia, Panama,
Philippines, Uruguay |
|
10 |
Guatemala, El Salvador, United States |
|
11 |
Brazil, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Paraguay |
|
12 |
Bolivia, Chile, Peru |
|
13 |
Colombia, Dominican R., Norway, Thailand
|
|
14 |
Denmark, India, S. Africa, Sweden |
|
15 |
Austria, Belgium, Finland, Iran, New Zealand,
Portugal, Venezuela |
|
16 |
Iraq, Netherlands, Turkey |
|
17 |
Eire, Israel, Spain |
|
18 |
Egypt, Gt. Britain, Mexico |
|
19 |
W. Germany, Greece, Indonesia, Italy |
|
20 |
Australia, Formosa, Japan |
|
21 |
Argentina, Burma, Canada, France |
|
22 |
China |
|
24 |
E. Germany |
|
26 |
Bulgaria |
|
27 |
Cuba |
|
29 |
Rumania |
|
32 |
Czechoslovakia |
|
35 |
Yugoslavia |
|
38 |
USSR |
How do other countries compare in this respect? The majority of non-totalitarian
countries have cabinets that number between 12 and 20 members. Taking the
average of over 60 countries, we find that it comes to over 16; the most popular
numbers are 15 (seven instances) and 9 (seven again). Easily the queerest
cabinet is that of New Zealand, one member of which has to be announced as
“Minister of Lands, Minister of Forests, Minister of Maori Affairs, Minister in
charge of Maori Trust Office and of Scenery Preservation.” The toastmaster at a
New Zealand banquet must be equally ready to crave silence for “The Minister of
Health, Minister Assistant to the Prime Minister, Minister in Charge of State
Advances Corporation, Census, and Statistics Department, Public Trust Office and
Publicity and Information.” In other lands this oriental profusion is
fortunately rare.
A study
of the British example would suggest that the point of ineffectiveness in a
cabinet is reached when the total membership exceeds 20 or perhaps 21. The
Council of the Crown, the King’s Council, the Privy Council had each passed the
20 mark when their decline began. The present British cabinet is just short of
that number now, having recoiled from the abyss. We might be tempted to conclude
from this that cabinets–or other committees –with a membership in excess of 21
are losing the reality of power and that those with a larger membership have
already lost it. No such theory can be tenable, however, without statistical
proof. Table II on the preceding page attempts to furnish part of it.
Should we be justified in drawing a line in that table under the name of France
(21 cabinet members) with an explanatory note to say that the cabinet is not the
real power in countries shown below that line? Some comitologists would accept
that conclusion without further research. Others emphasize the need for careful
investigation, more especially around the borderline of 21. But that the
coefficient of inefficiency must lie between 19 and 22 is now very generally
agreed.
What
tentative explanation can we offer for this hypothesis? Here we must distinguish
sharply between fact and theory, between the symptom and the disease. About the
most obvious symptom there is little disagreement. It is known that with over 20
members present a meeting begins to change character. Conversations develop
separately at either end of the table. To make himself heard, the member has
therefore to rise. Once on his feet, he cannot help making a speech, if only
from force of habit. “Mr. Chairman,” he will begin, “I think I may assert
without fear of contradiction–and I am speaking now from twenty-five (I might
almost say twenty-seven) years of experience–that we must view this matter in
the gravest light. A heavy responsibility rests upon us, sir, and I for one…”
Amid all this drivel the useful men present, if there are any, exchange little
notes that read, “Lunch with me tomorrow–we’ll fix it then.”
What else can they do? The voice drones on interminably. The
orator might just as well be talking in his sleep. The
committee of which he is the most useless member has ceased
to matter. It is finished. It is hopeless. It is dead.
...
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